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 No Coincidence? * 
 Matthew   Bedke 
 1.  INTRODUCTION 
 I will be discussing the following Coincidence Argument. 
 (1)  Normative beliefs are about sui generis, causally ineffi  cacious, norma-
tive facts. (Non-Natural Purport 1  ) 
 (2)  Causal [/Evolutionary] forces pushed us toward forming our norma-
tive beliefs and having the justifying grounds we have for those beliefs, 
but not  because those beliefs represented any normative facts. 2 (Lazy 
Normative Facts) 
 (3)  Th ere are many conceptually possible arrangements of non-natural, 
normative facts, including the absence of any, that are consistent with 
the causal[/evolutionary] facts and their infl uence on normative beliefs 
and their justifi ers. (Many Conceptual Possibilities) 
 *  Th anks to the audience at the Wisconsin Metaethics Workshop for helpful com-
ments. Special thanks to Justin Clarke-Doane, David Silver, Chris Stephens, Terence 
Cuneo, and David Copp for helping the project along. 
 1  Th is is meant to preclude non-cognitivist treatments of the discourse. Whether it 
includes “non-metaphysicalist” views like Parfi t’s is trickier. I think that it does so long as 
quietism is not a veiled form of non-cognitivism. 
 2  Th e “because” clauses are causal-explanatory. Th e justifying grounds I have in mind 
are intuitions and the beliefs that feed into refl ective equilibrium, though the Argument 
is not wedded to this epistemology. Whatever we base our normative beliefs on (in virtue 
of which they are meant to be justifi ed), the explanations for why we have those bases do 
not aver to the truth of the normative beliefs they putatively support. Also, this premise 
basically grants that one horn of Street’s Darwinian Dilemma is least desirable, namely, 
the one that holds that evolutionary forces pushed us toward certain normative beliefs 
because those beliefs are true. Non-naturalists should be with me on this. 
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 (4)  In relatively few of the possibilities in (3) do our normative beliefs rep-
resent normative facts (if such there be). 3 (Rare Alignment) 
 (5)  If (1), (2), (3), and (4), it would be an epistemic coincidence were we 
caused to form normative beliefs that represent the normative facts. 
(Conditional Coincidence) 
 (6)  It would be an epistemic coincidence were we caused to form norma-
tive beliefs that represent the normative facts. (Coincidence) 
 Th e epistemic upshot is meant to be this:  when the Coincidence 
Argument is seen to apply to some set of our normative beliefs, 
Coincidence defeats any justifi cation antecedently enjoyed by those 
beliefs. I take the Argument to roughly capture what exercised me in my 
(2009) and to perhaps more roughly capture the worries that Gibbard 
(2003:  ch. 13), Joyce (2001, 2006, forthcoming), Ruse (1986), Street 
(2006, 2008), and others are keen to push, and Enoch (2011:  ch. 7), 
Fitzpatrick (forthcoming a, b), Huemer (2005: 214–19), Kahane (2010), 
Schafer (2010), Shafer-Landau (2012), Skarsaune (2011), Wielenberg 
(2010), and others are keen to resist. 
 Of course, premises (1)–(4) are open to debate. But it is striking that 
those who accept these premises do not agree on whether a defeater threat-
ens. Both sides try to make their case largely through metaphor and anal-
ogy, where skeptics suggest partners in crime with clear cases of epistemic 
defeat, and non-skeptics suggest innocence by association with clear cases 
of epistemic acquittal. My aspiration is to sort this out. Th is chapter is 
an extended attempt to see clearly what might be epistemically troubling 
about (1)–(4). 
 Let me proceed as follows. First, I will comment on the Argument and 
how it is related to similar arguments in the vicinity. Second, I will con-
sider various attempts to bring the threat of epistemic defeat into sharper 
relief. Most of those attempts will be found wanting. In section 4, however, 
I articulate a principle—obliviousness—that does a better job. Th e problem 
with (1)–(4) is that they make normative beliefs oblivious to the normative 
facts (if such there be), where obliviousness is something like insensitivity 
of belief, justifi cation, and explanation to fact. 
 3  Th is basic idea has been put in terms of belief-forming processes failing to be reli-
able, beliefs failing to track the truth, or sheer coincidence of belief and fact, but all of 
these rely on some range of alternatives against which the evaluations of reliability, track-
ing, and coincidence are made. 
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 2.  THE “COINCIDENCE ARGUMENT” AND 
COINCIDENCE ARGUMENTS 
 I have formulated the Argument in terms of my preferred “cosmic coin-
cidence” version of it. Th e bracketed alternative sticks to evolutionary 
debunking arguments that are more common in the literature. Th e evo-
lutionary trimmings are inessential, however, for even if there are no sig-
nifi cant evolutionary infl uences at play for some normative beliefs, 4 there 
will still be  some complete causal explanation for why we have or tend to 
have the normative beliefs that we do. Th is explanation does not aver to 
non-natural normative facts, for those facts have no causal powers. Th at 
is part of the point of calling them non-natural. And noting this should 
generate as much a problem for normative non-naturalism as does an evo-
lutionary debunking argument. Even better, it need not rely on potentially 
controversial evolutionary explanations. 
 Th e Argument is more encompassing than some other debunking argu-
ments. Some debunking arguments are aimed at  moral beliefs. But the basic 
worry easily generalizes to all normative beliefs insofar as they concern 
non-natural matters. Similarly, Joshua Greene and Peter Singer have lately 
off ered selective debunking arguments that target deontology-friendly nor-
mative judgments (see Greene et  al. 2008; Singer 2005). Th ey typically 
rely on premises about what diff erences are morally relevant diff erences, or 
premises about the inferiority of judgments when and because they issue 
from certain cognitive processes, and argue that deontology-friendly judg-
ments are sensitive to morally irrelevant diff erences, or issue from suspect 
cognitive processes. Th e Argument is not so narrowly focused. It takes aim 
at consequentialism-friendly beliefs and indeed all other normative beliefs 
insofar as they concern non-natural matters. 
 Yet other debunking arguments hold that all substantive normative 
beliefs arise by processes, or in contexts, that are generally distorting or 
contaminating (Sinnott-Armstrong 2007; Street 2006). Th at sort of argu-
ment is fairly encompassing, but it fails to cast Non-Natural Purport, Lazy 
 4  See Parfi t (2011: 534–42). He thinks that the belief  that P’s likely truth is a reason to 
believe that P is no more advantageous than the belief  that P is likely true , for the latter 
suffi  ces to produce the belief that P. He also thinks it was not advantageous to believe  that 
we have reasons to promote the survival and hedonic well-being of ourselves and our children, 
to avoid agony , etc., for we are suffi  ciently motivated to do these things without the aid 
of beliefs about reasons for them. Regarding the Golden Rule, he thinks it is hard to see 
how evolutionary forces helped to instill belief in it. Parfi t is probably not considering all 
the relevant selective pressures. Be that as it may, the more general cosmic coincidence 
worry is immune to such controversies. 
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Normative Facts, Many Conceptual Possibilities, and Rare Alignment in 
leading roles. 
 Some moral epistemologists seem to endorse something like the 
Argument, but occasionally try to rely on fewer premises. Sharon Street, for 
example, does not talk of conceptually possible normative facts in her 2006 
paper except to say it is conceptually possible that pain counts in favor of 
that which causes it (2006: 148). In her 2008 paper, however, the range of 
conceptually possible arrangements of normative fact plays a central role in 
her summary of the Darwinian Dilemma. Th ere, what is too coincidental is 
that “evolutionary pressures aff ected our evaluative attitudes in such a way 
that they just happened to land on or near the true normative views among 
all the conceptually possible ones” (2006: 208–9). 
 Richard Joyce (forthcoming) is less sanguine about appeal to a range of 
possibilities. He does not think “counterpossibilities” are needed to estab-
lish the claim that a process is not truth-tracking. He simply emphasizes 
the claim that evolutionary explanations for our normative beliefs and 
belief-forming processes do not aver to normative facts. For him, this lack of 
explanatory role seems to suffi  ce to establish the absence of truth-tracking. 
So he sees a quicker route to our conclusion that only goes through Lazy 
Normative Facts. I do not. Showing that truth-tracking wasn’t  selected for 
is not yet to show that normative beliefs actually  fail to track truth, that it 
would be improbable (coincidental) were they to represent the facts, that 
the processes producing our beliefs do not reliably output true beliefs, or 
some such. 5 As Joyce himself notes, the causal (or evolutionary) stories by 
themselves are silent about what the normative facts are—their explanations 
do not aver to real normative facts—and so they are silent on whether or not 
evolutionary or causal forces have distorted our normative beliefs or pushed 
them toward conformity. For this reason we should be careful when we 
say that normative beliefs are the product of a  non- truth-tracking process. 
Th is is ambiguous between the claim that the process has been shown to be 
unreliable and the claim that causal explanations for the process do not aver 
to the target facts. Our premises only make use of the second claim. 
 Sometimes moral epistemologists drop reference to non-natural norma-
tive facts (Street 2006) or indeed to real facts (Joyce forthcoming). Th ough 
one might try to construct a coincidence-type argument that applies to 
normative naturalism or irrealist views, non-naturalism is a nice test case for 
seeing whether there is an epistemic  problem at all. Non-naturalism makes 
our job easier by separating out the normative facts from the facts that could 
enter into causal explanations, so we can focus on the relationship between 
(1)–(4) and an alleged epistemic defeater. If we can bring the defeater into 
 5  See also Copp (2008: 194–6). 
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relief, then others are free to craft analogous arguments for these other 
meta-normative positions. I am skeptical that the sort of defeater at play 
for non-naturalists extends to other meta-normative views. But my main 
concern is with non-naturalism as a test case. 
 One last remark on the Argument. I have stated its epistemic signifi cance 
in a way that is friendly to epistemic internalism, which we can gloss as 
the view that the justifi catory status of S’s belief that P strongly supervenes 
on S’s mental states. More specifi cally, I will be talking about an epistemic 
assessment of how well one proceeds in making up one’s mind based on 
the information to hand. 6 We are all trying to make up our minds about 
normative matters, and meta-normative matters, and there are certain con-
siderations we have to go on. If there is something about the world that 
is in no way accessible to us as we make up our minds, we should let the 
external chips fall where they may. We can still get our houses in order. If, 
on the other hand, using information accessible to us we can show that 
our normative beliefs are at best coincidentally true, or unlikely to track 
the non-natural facts, or at best inexplicably track them, or some such, 
we could only make up our minds in a procedurally justifi ed manner by 
revising some of the beliefs that generate the diffi  culty. Th e possibility that 
procedurally unjustifi ed beliefs might enjoy some other kind of justifi ca-
tion is cold comfort. So what follows focuses on this kind of internalist, 
procedural justifi cation, though perhaps similar worries can be cashed out 
in more externalism-friendly ways. 
 With all this in mind, let me turn to explore some opening moves in the 
debate. 
 3.  OPENING MOVES 
 I think we can put the initial worry this way. Causal forces would push us 
toward the same normative beliefs, and would push us toward having the 
same justifying grounds for those beliefs, regardless of what the normative 
facts turn out to be. If so, it would be coincidental should those forces hap-
pen to push us toward accurate representation of whichever normative facts 
turn out to be actual. Just this much gets me worried. 
 Others try to ease my distress by appealing to some normative facts. 
Th ey argue that, given that the normative facts are thus and such, it is no 
 6  I won’t comment on the tricky issues surrounding internalism here. Clearly, mental 
states are often about things external to the mind, and the information we go on is often 
information about things external to the mind. So it is not so easy to draw a line between 
internal items relevant to justifi cation and external items that are not. 
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coincidence that some of our beliefs represent them. Th e salve is roughly 
this: Why talk about what the normative facts  could be , and the number of 
conceptually possible arrangements, when we have justifi ed beliefs about 
what they  are ? David Enoch says that, given that survival and reproduc-
tive success are good, we can explain why beliefs that they are good would 
non-coincidentally correlate with the facts, for it looks like evolution-
ary forces would have pushed us in the direction of having such beliefs 
(2011: 168–75). Erik Wielenberg says that if people with certain cognitive 
processes have rights, we can explain why we know we have such rights, for 
evolutionary forces would have pushed us in the direction of having the cog-
nitive processes needed to be rights-bearers, and such processes would have 
led us to believe that we have rights (2010: 447–52). And Knut Skarsaune 
says that, if pleasure is good, we can explain why belief that it is good is 
truth conducive, for evolutionary forces would have infl uenced us to have 
this true belief (2011: 233–6). (Actually, he relies on a dilemmatic structure 
to either save the realist in the above fashion, or to concede to the skeptic.) 
 In each case, certain normative facts would help to explain why beliefs 
about those facts are not merely coincidentally correct. Enoch emphasizes 
that no particular explanation given need be the one that discharges the 
burden. So long as  some explanation is available for the non-coincidental 
correctness of normative beliefs the problem is (re)solved (2011:  171). 
Ideally, there are several such explanations yielding a decent stock of justi-
fi ed normative beliefs, enough to ascend from there via rational inferences 
to an even bigger set of justifi ed normative beliefs and perhaps even norma-
tive theories. 
 It is at this point that you might wonder whether we are entitled to rely 
on beliefs about what the normative facts are to get the relevant explana-
tions for non-coincidentality. It helps me to think through a familiar anal-
ogy outside of normative theory. If we wonder whether our experiences as 
of an external world are largely correct what we do is rely on experience, 
and experience-based beliefs, to assuage our fears. We do think that evo-
lutionary forces, inter alia, have pushed us toward representation of facts 
of the external world; we think that a large swath of such beliefs reliably 
track truth. But these assurances are all built on the back of experience, and 
experience-based beliefs. Th at is OK so long as we are prima facie justifi ed 
in relying on experience out of the starting gate, as it were. It can then play 
a role in vindicating its deliverances, and there is nothing question-begging 
about that vindication. Turning back to normativity, experience as of an 
external world alone does not vindicate the thought that normative beliefs 
adequately represent the normative facts. But do not some normative beliefs 
enjoy prima facie justifi cation just as some beliefs about the external world 
do? If so, we can also rely on them out of the gate, just as we can rely 
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on experience and experience-based beliefs out of the gate. So let us rely 
on prima facie justifi ed normative beliefs. In turn, we discover that causal 
forces have pushed us toward representation of some normative facts. In 
both cases, we do not wind up vindicating  every belief about the external 
world and  every normative belief. And perhaps proceeding this way  cannot 
deliver universal debunking. But in both cases we fi nd adequate representa-
tion of fact and the ability to further prune and revise. 7 
 What shall we make of these opening volleys? It is as though proponents 
of the Coincidence Argument—let us call them  skeptics —maintain that we 
must think each of some set of possible arrangements of normative fact 
are  equally epistemically likely unless there is reason for thinking otherwise. 
Th ey think we could break this symmetry if we had some causal explanation 
for why fact and belief would adequately align. But we do not. If nothing 
breaks the symmetry, adequate alignment between belief and fact is surely 
coincidental. Opponents of the argument—let us call them  realists —grant 
that there is no purely causal explanation for why belief and fact would 
adequately align. And they grant that there are lots of conceptually possi-
ble arrangements of normative fact. Th ey point out, however, that we have 
prima facie justifi cation for believing that we are in some subset of all those 
possibilities, a subset wherein the evolutionary or causal forces have ade-
quately pushed our beliefs toward alignment with fact. Ranging across this 
subset, belief-forming processes are reliable enough, belief suffi  ciently tracks 
truth, etc. For the realist, there is a mixed normative-causal explanation for 
adequate alignment. And why not help ourselves to our prima facie justifi ed 
beliefs in the explanation, just as we help ourselves to beliefs justifi ed by 
experience when we generate causal explanations for the non-coincidental 
correctness of perception? 
 I think this puts some pressure on skeptics to say more about why realists 
are not entitled to rely on their prima facie justifi ed normative beliefs to 
locate them in an area of possibility space where there is adequate align-
ment. In the next few sub-sections, let me develop a couple of lines of argu-
ment of behalf of skeptics, and consider replies by realists. Th ings will be 
looking pretty good for the realist here. It won’t be until section 4 develops 
 7  Street (2008: 216–17) grants this, but wishes to draw a distinction between good 
and no good accounts of reliability. I  am puzzled by her ensuing discussion. It seems 
like good normative theory will help sort out which starting points are likely true, and 
which belief-forming processes are reliable. I have already cited Greene and Singer as 
examples of people who start with prima facie justifi ed normative beliefs and evolution-
ary theory to identify kinds of normative beliefs (deontology-friendly) as likely false, and 
the processes that produce them as unreliable, while identifying other kinds of normative 
beliefs (consequentialism-friendly) as likely true, and the processes that produce them as 
reliable. I don’t mean to agree with their assessment, but just to point out a project that 
parallels the partial vindication of experience by relying on experience. 
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coincidence as obliviousness that we will see what is problematic about 
premises (1)–(4). 
 3.1  Random or Unreliable Analogies 
 Here is one thing the skeptic might say. Despite the prima facie justifi cation 
of some normative beliefs, seeing that premises (1)–(4) hold is tantamount 
to realizing one’s beliefs were generated  randomly or unreliably . Drawing 
out the thought, Street describes a case where you learn that your views 
about Jupiter have been implanted in you by a hypnotist who picked them 
out of a hat (2008: 214). In that case, one cannot justifi ably rely on one’s 
Jupiter beliefs to discover that the hat-drawing hypnotic process tracked 
Jupiter truths. Th ere are a lot of possible Jupiter facts, and it would be 
too coincidental to suppose that the hat-drawing hypnotic process hap-
pened to align belief with fact. Similarly, Joyce describes a couple of cases 
involving belief pills. In one, you learn that you took a pill that induced 
the particular belief that Napoleon lost the battle of Waterloo (2006: 179). 
In another, you learn that you took a pill that induced you to have beliefs 
about Napoleon in general, where various environmental factors helped to 
determine  which Napoleon beliefs you formed, but where you would not 
have  any Napoleon beliefs at all without the pill (2006: 181). In both cases, 
the relevant Napoleon beliefs have been defeated. 
 Th ese are interesting cases, yet they are not clearly analogous to the 
Argument. Street tells us that the hypnotist picked the Jupiter views out 
of a hat, which most of us would reasonably take to be a random process, 
or one generally known to be unreliable. Similarly, forming beliefs by pill 
is reasonably taken to be random or unreliable. So the problem with using 
these cases as damning analogies is that it might not be similarly clear that 
the ex ante reasonable attitude toward the causal processes that infl uenced 
normative beliefs is suspicion that they are random or generally unreliable. 
To help see the point, consider a case where you learn that a book published 
by Kendall Hunt induced your Jupiter and Napoleon beliefs. In that case we 
would not assume that this is a random or generally unreliable way to form 
beliefs. It is just historical information that is epistemically benign (at least 
for those unfamiliar with Kendall Hunt; if that’s too loaded with epistemic 
relevance for you, imagine the history is about the paper or the ink of the 
book). Th e realist can reasonably wonder why the historical information 
supplied by the Coincidence Argument is not similarly benign. 
 On this point, consider two kinds of skeptical case. In one case you real-
ize is that it is  possible that you are a brain in a vat with the same experi-
ences you now have, but where your beliefs are largely false. In another case 
you realize is that the entire population of earth  has gone through a random 
oxfordhb-9780198709299.indd   109 12/19/2013   12:32:06 PM
Matthew Bedke110
selection procedure at birth to determine which half of the population will 
be envatted (and handless) for the rest of their lives and which will roam 
the earth unmolested. Now, maybe the fi rst, purely modal, scenario induces 
some skepticism. But the second, probabilistic, scenario is far worse. It 
strikes me that Street’s Jupiter case and Joyce’s belief pill cases look more like 
the second skeptical scenario, where we reasonably believe that randomiza-
tion or unreliability has intervened, whereas the Coincidence Argument 
does not clearly introduce such processes and seems more analogous to 
skepticism based on the mere possibility of envatment. 
 Having said that, I like the Jupiter and Napoleon cases, and I do think 
they have features that generate the same coincidence concern as is found in 
the Argument. It is just that these cases have  extra features that give rise to 
further epistemic diffi  culties. Th is might lead realists to reasonably dismiss 
them as disanalogous and so non-probative of the normative situation. Let 
me save further discussion of how these cases are relevant for section 4. As 
we shall see, it is the fact that they feature oblivious beliefs that makes them 
damning analogies, where obliviousness can be pulled apart from process 
that we ex ante reasonably believe to be random or unreliable. Before get-
ting to that, I want to discuss some other lines of argument available to the 
skeptic. 
 3.2  Generic Skepticism? 
 Perhaps the skeptic should categorize the Coincidence Argument as an 
instance of generic skepticism. For one way to argue that each conceptual 
possibility is equally epistemically likely, despite putatively justifi ed beliefs 
that favor some possibilities over others, is to argue as follows. If your puta-
tive justifi cation cannot discriminate between scenarios in that you would 
have the same justifi cation across the two scenarios, that putative justifi -
cation cannot favor some of those scenarios over others. In the classical 
skeptical case the thought would be that the appearance as of having hands 
cannot discriminate between the possibility that one is envatted (and not 
handed) but made to have the appearance as of having hands, and the pos-
sibility that one has hands that refl ect light into one’s eyes, etc., etc. . . . . So 
these scenarios are equally epistemically likely. Neither is favored over the 
other by one’s putative evidence of it appearing as though you have hands. 
Mutatis mutandis, perhaps one’s putative prima facie justifi cation for nor-
mative beliefs cannot discriminate among conceptually possible arrange-
ments of normative fact. Th e justifi cations are non-discriminatory because 
we realize they are fi xed by the causal ways of the world, so you would have 
the same justifi cation for your normative beliefs across the possible scenar-
ios where we hold the non-normative ways of the world fi xed and vary the 
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normative ways of the world. Perhaps one is thereby unjustifi ed in believing 
that some one of these possibilities obtains rather than others. 
 If that is the point, realists can reply to skeptics in the standard ways. 
One could appeal to contextualist accounts to grant lack of justifi cation 
when skeptical possibilities are salient, but maintain justifi cation when 
they are not salient. Th is raises the interesting possibility that by making 
Non-Naturalist Purport contextually salient one introduces possibilities 
that need to be ruled out to have justifi ed belief, just as raising BIV sce-
narios raises possibilities that then need to be ruled out. On such a view, 
justifi ed normative belief would ebb and fl ow between attainable and elu-
sive depending on whether the non-naturalist has her metaethics in view. 
Alternatively, one could be Moorean, where agents that cannot discriminate 
between scenarios (skeptical and non-skeptical) are justifi ed in thinking 
they are in a non-skeptical scenario. Some of these agents will be lucky in 
that their external environment will cooperate while others will be unlucky 
in that their external environment will not. But procedurally they are all 
justifi ed in thinking they are in the lucky scenario. Or so the thought goes. 
Whatever the response, realists can relax if their normative beliefs are no 
worse off  than their beliefs about having hands. 
 3.3  Begging Questions? 
 So what if we let realists justifi ably rely on some normative beliefs to explain 
non-coincidental alignment between belief and fact? What if we leverage 
these beliefs:  reproductive success is good, we have certain rights, pleas-
ure is good? Skeptics are then likely to vent some frustration. Joyce, for 
instance, says that the above authors have “speculated,” “stipulated,” and 
“conjectured” about the normative facts, whereas they need to make the 
views “plausible” before they can debunk the debunkers (forthcoming). 
Street says “It is no answer to this challenge simply to assume a large swath 
of substantive views on how we have reason to live . . . and then note that 
these are the very views evolutionary forces pushed us toward” (2008: 214). 
 Of course, skeptical frustration is misdirected if it fails to grant prima 
facie (defeasible) justifi cation for some normative beliefs. If they are not 
prima facie justifi ed, why the Coincidence Argument? Realists would lack 
justifi cation for their normative beliefs before the skeptic utters word one. 
So I do not think we can charge the realist with speculation, stipulation, 
conjecture, or the like until we convincingly establish defeat of that prima 
facie justifi cation. 
 In addition, the skeptics are at risk of arguing in circular fashion. For 
it can look as though they assume one’s normative beliefs lack prima facie 
justifi cation (and hence cannot help locate one in possibility space) to argue 
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one into a conclusion that is meant to count as a defeater for said prima 
facie justifi cation. Not a classical kind of circularity, but one that assumes 
lack of justifi cation to show lack justifi cation. 8 
 Unfortunately, some realists seem to mischaracterize the nature of their 
burden, and that gives the skeptics a false sense of security. Enoch suggests 
that he is providing a defeater for a defeater by off ering explanations of 
non-coincidence that rely on normative premises (2011: 170 n. 41). But 
you cannot defeat a defeater by relying on the defeated belief. Th at would 
be like acknowledging that you are not justifi ed in believing a wall is red 
after learning it is bathed in red light half the time, but then enlisting your 
belief that the wall is red,  justifi ed by how red it looks , to defeat the defeater. 
 We should not think of the replies on behalf of realists above and else-
where as attempts to  defeat a defeater or  reinstate justifi cation . Instead, they 
should be cast as expressions of incredulity that there is a defeater in the fi rst 
place. Unless realists can be made to see the defeater they are well justifi ed 
in relying on their (still) justifi ed normative beliefs to account for various 
ways in which their beliefs are non-coincidentally true. Th e response is not 
to charge them with begging the question, but to show that there is indeed 
a defeater there. 9 
 Until that is done, realists might reasonably see the Coincidence 
Argument as turning a blind eye to prima facie justifi cation, as a prema-
ture refusal to let justifi ed normative beliefs pare down possibility space, 
as smuggling in suppressed and unjustifi ed premises about randomness or 
general unreliability, or as a recipe for generic skepticism. It is no wonder 
they are not yet worried. 
 3.4  But Still . . . an Inexplicable Alignment? 
 So far we have seen explanations for why we would tend to believe P, for 
some normative propositions P that we antecedently justifi ably believe 
 8  Cf. Schafer (2010). 
 9  Another form of begging the question is purely dialectical and is not at issue. It is 
the sort you get when you use premises your opponent does not justifi ably share in an 
attempt to convince him of some conclusion. As far as the Coincidence Argument is con-
cerned, the background project is for the realist to make up her mind about normative 
non-naturalism and belief in particular normative propositions. Th e Argument is meant 
to off er up some considerations that should make her retract her views in the face of 
prima facie justifi cation. When making up her mind she can use premises she is justifi ed 
in believing even if others do not share those views. (But, really, if we cleanly separate out 
the fi rst-order normative beliefs from the second-order metaphysical interpretation of 
their contents and focus on the former, who thinks they lack prima facie justifi cation for 
some relevant normative proposition to which the realist is helping herself?) 
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(pleasure is good, survival is good, etc.). Suppose we do this one-by-one for 
many normative propositions P and theorize from there. 
 Perhaps there is a residual explanatory gap not yet addressed. For there is 
this related, second question: Granting that we have gotten these normative 
facts right, would we would get the normative facts right  as such (Gibbard 
2003:  ch. 13)? Essentially, this is a demand that we explain why our 
belief-forming processes would reliably track the normative truths  whatever 
they turn out to be (perhaps within a reasonable variation of possibilities, but 
certainly across some possibilities we have no prima facie reason to think 
actually obtain). 10 Th e demand can be met in the case of perception of the 
external world. Not only is there actual alignment between many beliefs 
and facts, but there would be alignment across a range of nearby possibili-
ties where the facts change a bit. 
 Before we ask whether the demand is met in the normative case, we 
should ask whether it is a fair explanatory demand in the fi rst place. I’m not 
sure what to say. On the one hand, it is questionable that lack of explana-
tion for some kind of reliability is a defeater, for it is questionable that some 
showing of reliability is needed for procedural justifi cation. As noted above, 
we do not need to show that perceptual experience, or the beliefs based on 
them, reliably track truth before justifi ably relying on them. More worri-
some would be a positive showing of unreliability, but the Argument does 
not supply that. 11 
 One way of developing Gibbbard’s worry is not to demand an explana-
tion of reliability prior to having justifi ed normative beliefs, but to demand 
that the initial justifi ed reliance on normative belief eventually lead to an 
account of reliability. I like to think of this as probationary epistemology. 
Th e basic idea is this: One can justifi ably rely on basically justifi ed beliefs 
( a ) until one comes to have justifi cation for believing in their reliability after 
suffi  cient inquiry, perhaps by appealing to the very beliefs enjoying proba-
tionary justifi cation, in which case their justifi catory status becomes secure, 
or ( b ) until one fails to come across such justifi ed beliefs about reliability 
despite suffi  cient inquiry, in which case the probationary justifi cation lapses 
and the beliefs are no longer justifi ed. If these are sound epistemic ideas, 
 10  Regarding mathematical Platonism, Field has a similar worry that “how our beliefs 
about . . . remote entities can so well refl ect the facts about them” is  in principle inexplica-
ble (Field 2005; cf. Clarke-Doane forthcoming). 
 11  Even if an explanation of reliability is needed, it is not clear how robust the reli-
ability has to be. In the case of experience of the external world, it is not literally the case 
that we would reliably track truths  whatever they turn out to be (hence the parenthetical 
about reasonable variation). Given that, it is not clear to me that we do not get analo-
gous reliability across reasonable variation in the normative case, especially once we are 
allowed prima facie justifi ed normative beliefs to help settle how the normative facts vary 
with variations in the non-normative facts. 
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one might complain that the probationary justifi cation of normative beliefs 
has lapsed, whereas experience-based beliefs have passed their probationary 
justifi cation and earned secured justifi cation. 
 Th is probationary epistemology is worth further exploration. But I think 
there might be a quicker route to skepticism. Rather than try to show nor-
mative beliefs are unreliable, or show that we cannot explain how they 
could be reliable after suffi  cient inquiry, perhaps the thing to focus on is 
their insensitivity to the facts they are about. Th is is related to reliability 
worries, but more narrowly focused on what one believes in nearby worlds 
where one’s beliefs are false. I think the best way to develop this thought is 
in terms of obliviousness, so let me turn to that now. 
 4  COINCIDENCE AS OBLIVIOUSNESS 
 I want to show that premises (1)–(4) of the Coincidence Argument ensure 
that normative beliefs, justifi cations, and explanations are robustly insensi-
tive to fact. Sensitivity is usually discussed as a condition on knowledge, 
where one’s justifi ed true belief is sensitive if (defn.) in the nearest possible 
world(s) where the belief is not true, one would no longer believe it. We are 
talking about procedural justifi cation, so conditions on knowledge are not 
directly relevant. Still, when making up one’s mind about whether to believe 
P it does seem relevant whether, were P false, one would have believed that 
P. Realizing that this is the case should cause some concern. Realizing in 
addition that there is some erstwhile justifying basis J for the belief that 
P that would be the same were P false should cause even more concern. 
And fi nally, realizing that, were P false, the same explanation would hold 
for why one has the justifi cation J and belief that P should be even more 
disconcerting. 
 Let us say, then, that the belief that P based on justifi cation J is  oblivious 
to the target fact when it meets these conditions—when, were P not the 
case, (i) one would believe that P, (ii) one would have the same justifi cation 
J for believing that P, and (iii) the same causal explanations for why one 
believes that P and why one has justifi cation J would hold. 12 I claim that 
realization that one’s belief that P is oblivious to the target fact is a defeater 
for justifi cation J. Once defeated, J cannot help to locate us in the space of 
possibilities. And that is what makes adequate alignment between belief and 
fact too coincidental to accept. 
 12  It is not clear to me whether we need (iii) to get defeat. In classic cases of defeat, 
like the red wall case discussed below, (i) and (ii) seem to suffi  ce. But the addition of (iii) 
makes the case for defeat for normative non-naturalism that much better. 
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 Premises (1)–(4) of the Coincidence Argument ensure that normative 
beliefs about basic non-natural facts are oblivious. Let prima facie justi-
fi cation do its work, so we take ourselves to be in some world where the 
causal forces conspired to adequately align normative belief with fact. So 
anchored, we wonder what we would believe, and what justifi cation we 
would have, and why we would have it, were the basic normative facts other 
than we believe them to be. We realize that everything we believe about the 
natural world can be held fi xed in these scenarios we are imagining. We 
need only imagine scenarios where the basic normative facts diff er or do not 
exist, so that pain isn’t bad, or pleasure is not good, or some such (always 
construed as a diff erence in non-natural fact of the matter). Were that the 
case, we would have the same normative beliefs, the same justifi cation for 
them (e.g. it would still seem as though pain is bad, pleasure is good, and 
so on), and the very same causal explanations for why we have those beliefs 
and those justifi cations would apply. Our beliefs are oblivious to the facts. 
Justifi cation defeated. 
 Generic skeptical cases do not exhibit this defeater. Let us grant that one 
has justifi cation for believing that one has hands, and so one centers oneself 
in a range of possibilities where belief and fact align. When one wonders 
what one would have believed if one didn’t have hands, the nearby scenarios 
to consider are those where one lost one’s hands in a tragic accident. In 
those scenarios one would no longer believe that one has hands, and surely 
one’s evidence for being handed would diff er. So the belief that one has 
hands is not oblivious to the fact. Th is mirrors application of sensitivity 
requirements on knowledge. 
 Obliviousness helps to see how Street’s Jupiter case and Joyce’s belief pills 
cases introduce conditions analogous to (1)–(4) of the Argument (as well as 
additional epistemic diffi  culties already discussed). In Street’s case, for any 
given Jupiter belief, if that belief were false one would still believe it, one 
would have the same justifi cation for so believing, and the same explanation 
for why one has the belief and justifi cation would hold—namely, the hyp-
notist pulled that slip out of a hat. In Joyce’s cases, for any given belief about 
Napoleon, if the belief were false one would still believe it, one would have 
the same justifi cation for so believing, and the same explanation for why 
one has the belief and justifi cation would hold—namely, the pill (plus envi-
ronmental factors) induced the belief. Th at these processes are additionally 
known to be unreliable or random is an extra diffi  culty. But we could have 
a string of more benign historical information—about the publisher of the 
book, the ink, etc.—that cumulatively meet the obliviousness conditions 
and thereby constitute defeat. 
 My hope is that when this epistemic principle of obliviousness is spelled 
out and seen to apply whenever the conditions of premises (1)–(4) above 
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are met, it will bring the case for defeat into sharper relief. Admittedly, it is 
diffi  cult to explain why fundamental normative statuses are as they are, so 
it is diffi  cult to explain further why recognized obliviousness is a defeater. 13 
Nevertheless, it does seem on its face to capture an epistemic concern, and 
it nicely categorizes and explains not only the above cases, but also classical 
cases of defeat. Consider the old red light illuminating a wall case. Initially 
you believe a red-looking wall is red. When you realize the wall is illumi-
nated with red light, what seems to make that a defeater is obliviousness, or 
something very similar to it. 
 Th e main source of resistance in the normative case, I suspect, concerns 
the necessity of the fundamental normative truths. How can we consider 
what would be the case were pain not bad when we justifi ably believe ( a ) 
that pain is bad, ( b ) that if pain is bad, then necessarily it is bad, and so ( c ) 
that necessarily pain is bad? However, we should not be glib about appeals 
to necessitation. Whether they block application of obliviousness depends 
on what kind of necessitation we are talking about and how we interpret 
the subjunctives. 
 4.1  Obliviousness to Necessary Truths 
 Th ere is nothing inherently strange about being oblivious to whatever turns 
out to be a necessary truth, at least for certain necessary truths. Consider 
Sally, who is justifi ably convinced that the world is governed by determin-
istic laws of nature. While in a bar one night she refl ects on this belief, and 
forms the conditional belief that if Dropout sinks the eight ball, necessarily 
Dropout sinks the eight ball. Dropout shoots and . . . sinks the eight ball. 
Now Sally justifi ably believes that, necessarily, Dropout sunk the eight ball 
in that there is no nomologically possible world (i.e. one with the same past 
and deterministic laws) where Dropout did not sink the eight ball. Can she 
still intelligibly wonder what she would have believed were it not the case 
that Dropout sunk the eight ball? Yes. Nomological necessity does not get 
in the way. And, fortunately, Sally justifi ably believes that, if Dropout hadn’t 
 13  How obliviousness applies to beliefs about the future and beliefs based on enumera-
tive induction is a tricky matter. For some such beliefs, obliviousness will be a concern. 
(Not for all. Consider: What would I believe, and what would be my justifi cation for 
believing it (and what explains both), were the sun not to rise tomorrow? Well, the near-
est possibility where that happens is one where the laws of nature diff er, or where there 
has been good evidence that sun will not rise. If so, my belief that it will rise is not oblivi-
ous.) But these will be special cases in epistemology generally, where we think that there 
are grounds for justifi ed belief—e.g. some uniformity of nature thesis—despite forms 
of insensitivity. Non-naturalist realists have off ered no reason for grouping normative 
facts with facts about the future and the unenumerated so as to enjoy those justifi catory 
grounds. 
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sunk the eight ball, she wouldn’t have believed that he did, and would have 
lacked justifi cation for believing it. Maybe he would have set her up for an 
easy win. In any event, her belief is not oblivious. 
 Or consider Claire, who sells glacier water. She justifi ably believes that 
water is H 2 O. Moreover, she has read enough philosophy to justifi ably 
believe that if water is H 2 O, then necessarily it is H 2 O. So she thinks that 
necessarily water is H 2 O. As we like to say, there is no metaphysically pos-
sible world where water is not H 2 O. Can Claire still intelligibly wonder 
what would be the case if water were not H 2 O? Th is is a trickier case. It is 
easy to hear the question along the following lines: What would be the case 
if this stuff  (splash it around for emphasis) were not this stuff  (again, splash 
it around for emphasis)?  Th at seems unintelligible. In other words, if we 
think of this necessity as secured by a special kind of reference enjoyed by 
these terms, where they pick out the same referent directly and rigidly, then 
perhaps the question is not really intelligible. 
 Suppose so. Still, non-naturalists should not take comfort in the exam-
ple. For they eschew theories of co-reference that would make our norma-
tive subjunctives as problematic as the one above about water. Th ey think 
that “bad” refers to a diff erent property than any natural one. If they are 
right, then when we ask what would be the case were pain not bad we are 
not asking about what would be the case were something not itself. We are 
asking about what would be the case if pain had a diff erent normative prop-
erty than the one we take it to have, or no normative property whatsoever. 
Unlike the case of water, there is no threat that the meaningfulness of the 
subjunctive is ruled out by a special kind of referential relationship. 
 To aid discussion, it helps to distinguish two ways one might justifi ably 
believe the necessity of substantive normative truths. One way is derivative 
and parasitic on justifi ed beliefs in actual substantive normative truths. In 
that case, one’s justifi ed belief about  which substantive normative truths 
are the necessary ones is derived from ( a ) the general belief that norma-
tive truths are necessary, and ( b ) beliefs in actual, substantive normative 
propositions, where the justifi cation for ( a ) does not depend on having jus-
tifi ed beliefs of type ( b ). For example, one might justifi ably believe that 
some supervenience principle holds a priori because it is analytic: 14 neces-
sarily, if some object O has normative status S, necessarily any object that 
is identical to O in all non-normative respects has normative status S. Th at 
would be a general, non-substantive normative belief. If one also justifi ably 
believes that some episode of pain is bad, one can then infer that, necessar-
ily, anything identical to that episode of pain in all non-normative respects 
 14  Th ough how we are justifi ed in believing the necessities is not relevant, so long as 
their justifi cation is separate from the justifi cation of the normative statuses of things. 
oxfordhb-9780198709299.indd   117 12/19/2013   12:32:07 PM
Matthew Bedke118
is bad. Th at is the sense in which this episode of pain is necessarily bad. 15 
Alternatively, one might justifi ably believe that basic normative principles 
are necessarily true, justifi ably believe that an actual basic moral principle is 
 an action is right iff  and because it maximizes happiness , and infer that, neces-
sarily, an action is right iff  and because it maximizes happiness. 
 However general beliefs about the necessity of truths in a domain are 
justifi ed, the necessity of the truths does not insulate the particular beliefs 
in that domain from sensitivity-type tests. To see this, set to one side the 
justifi ed general belief that normative truths are necessary and focus on 
non-modal beliefs about what the normative facts are. Let us rehearse the 
example about pain being bad. If pain were not bad—consider this coun-
terfactually if you like—would we still believe it to be bad, and would we 
have the same justifi cation for so believing, and would the same explanation 
for why we have that belief and that justifi cation hold? Unfortunately, the 
answers are all “yes”. So that belief is oblivious, as are the stronger modal 
beliefs derived from it and some general necessitarian thesis. 
 Let us craft an eight-ball case that features similarly oblivious beliefs, 
just to convince ourselves. Imagine that Sally learns that she took a pill that 
would cause her to hallucinate sinking eight balls. She now thinks the belief 
that Dropout sunk the eight ball oblivious. She cannot block obliviousness 
by noting that events that did take place are nomologically necessitated, 
as though there is a problem even considering the obliviousness questions 
because they take us to counter-possible worlds. Obliviousness of the belief 
about the actual event ensures that she cannot justifi ably locate herself in 
the right space of nomic possibilities, so she does not know if she is asking 
after counter-possibilities or genuine possibilities. To know that she must 
fi rst settle what the actual world is like, and she lacks justifi cation for beliefs 
about it insofar as they are recognizably oblivious. 
 Now, replace sinking the eight ball with the badness of pain, nomic 
necessity with normative necessity, and the pill with premises (1)–(4) of 
the Coincidence Argument, and you have an analogous problem on your 
hands. Th e realist cannot block obliviousness by noting that normative sta-
tuses are necessitated, as though there is a problem even considering the 
sensitivity-type questions because they take us to normatively impossible 
 15  Some views about a posteriori knowable identities would be structurally similar. We 
might know a priori that water is the stuff  that meets some set of criteria associated with 
the concept of water, and then discover a posteriori the nature of the stuff  that actually 
meets those criteria. We would then be able to infer the substantive necessity that water is 
that stuff . Th ose who endorse this view of things should have no problem testing for the 
obliviousness of the beliefs about the nature of the stuff  that meets the relevant criteria. 
Obliviousness of those beliefs would ensure that one cannot justifi ably locate oneself in 
the right space of metaphysical possibilities. 
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worlds. Obliviousness of the belief about badness ensures that she cannot 
justifi ably locate herself in the right space of normative possibilities. What 
is possible and what is impossible depends on what the actual world is like, 
and we lack justifi cation for beliefs about it insofar as they are recognizably 
oblivious. 
 So far I have only discussed one way of justifi ably believing in the neces-
sity of substantive normative truths. Th e second way of being justifi ed is 
more direct—it is not via inference with a premise concerning actual sub-
stantive normative propositions. Perhaps, for example, one is more directly 
justifi ed in thinking that  necessarily pain (or an episode of pain like  that ) 
is bad. Maybe I know directly the modal status of this synthetic claim, or 
synthetic moral principles. Would that make it harder to intelligibly apply 
the subjunctives that test for obliviousness? 
 It might seem so. For it looks like our counterfactuals have built-in 
counter-possibility. But this is a pretty cheap way for a justifi ed belief to 
gain immunity from the threat of obliviousness. Th e necessity is still part of 
the content of the belief, so it should be possible to show a belief with that 
content—or any content—is oblivious or not. 
 To handle the situation, we can think of the obliviousness subjunctives 
as asking after  allodoxic possibilities, not counterfactuals. Allodoxic possi-
bilities are false belief possibilities—they are those we can assume to obtain 
contrary to what we actually believe and our justifying bases for believing 
it. 16 Assuming our actual beliefs are false and justifying bases misleading, we 
can then emphasize the third component of obliviousness: How much of 
our explanatory picture of the world would have to change to explain how 
our beliefs and justifi cations get things so wrong? 
 To see how this works, consider the belief that water is H 2 O and all our 
justifi cation for believing it. To consider the allodoxic possibility that it is 
not H 2 O we assume for the sake of further inquiry that it is not H 2 O (and 
never has been), and then examine what adjustments to our explanatory 
picture of the world would have to change to explain why we nevertheless 
have all this justifi cation/evidence/reason in favor of the false belief that it is 
H 2 O. Th ere is a lot of explaining to do, of course. Have the chemists been 
lying to us? What of the chemistry I think I know that explains why water 
has some of the interesting properties it has, like the fact that it expands 
when it freezes? We can see that the belief that water is H 2 O does not meet 
the obliviousness criteria, interpreted in terms of an allodoxic possibility. 
 16  I prefer this way of thinking about the questions over near cousins (e.g. 
counter-actuals and various ways of separating two dimensions of intension). Th ose 
alternatives either get at slightly diff erent questions, or get at the same questions in more 
confusing ways. Also, it seems natural to ask after allodoxic possibilities with the subjec-
tive mood. But if it bothers you, try indicatives. 
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Neither would the modal belief that, necessarily, water is H 2 O. Assuming 
that is false for the sake of argument, we would have a lot of explaining to 
do for why we have the false belief and the misleading evidence we have. 17 
 Now, assume it is not the case that, necessarily, pain is bad, as part of an 
allodoxic possibility. Let us hold fi xed the non-normative ways of the world 
(as we justifi ably believe them to be). Focusing on the third part of the 
obliviousness criteria, what of our explanatory picture of the world needs to 
change to explain how we nevertheless have all this justifi cation/evidence/
reason in favor of the false belief that, necessarily, pain is bad? For example, 
what of our causal-explanatory picture must change to explain why we have 
the intuition that it is bad? Well, nothing. In the assumed scenario, there 
is no additional or diff erent explanation for why we (ex ante) justifi ably 
believe pain is necessarily bad. If some evolutionary explanation explains 
why we think pain is necessarily bad, and explains why we have the justify-
ing bases for so believing, that same explanation holds under the allodoxic 
possibility that pain is not necessarily bad. Th is belief is oblivious. 
 We avoid this result if we deny that these allodoxic possibilities are con-
ceptual possibilities, or hold that our justifi cations constitutively depend 
on the normative facts of the matter (no facts, no justifi cations). I do not 
see how the former can be squared with non-naturalist realism, whereby 
basic, substantive normative beliefs are about stance-independent facts that 
cannot be known merely by refl ection on concepts. And the latter cannot 
be squared with procedural justifi cation and causal closure of the natural 
world, for when making up our minds about normative matters we do not 
have the non-natural facts to go on, and if we did the natural world would 
not be causally closed. I see no other way of avoiding the defeat. 
 4.2  Better Safe than Sensitive? 
 Nevertheless, there are some things that worry me about obliviousness. First, 
it is a cousin of sensitivity requirements on knowledge, which have been 
called into question. I take some comfort in the fact that non-obliviousness 
is a condition on procedural justifi cation with a few more bells and whistles 
than sensitivity. But these days some prefer a safety condition on knowledge 
in lieu of a sensitivity condition, in part because of apparent diffi  culties 
when applying sensitivity to modal truths. A belief that P is safe if (def.) in 
many(/all) nearby possibilities where one believes P, P. 
 17  Similarly, if you wonder about being envatted as the actual state of things, you 
have a lot of explaining to do. A good deal of your beliefs and justifi cations regarding the 
external world would be explained not via interaction with the external world, but by 
interaction with some systematically deceptive device. 
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 I have suggested that the modal concerns might be overstated. 
Nevertheless, it would be nice for the skeptic were normative beliefs in 
non-natural facts unsafe as well as oblivious. Th e problem here is fi guring 
out which possibilities are  nearby . Are possibilities where the (necessary) 
normative facts are not as we believe them to be nearby? Maybe. One meas-
ure of nearness is how much of our ordinary explanatory picture must be 
shifted to adequately explain what is going on in a target possible world. 
BIV worlds are obviously far off  on this metric. But in worlds where the 
(necessary) normative facts are other than we believe them to be nothing in 
our causal-explanatory picture of the world need be shifted. So maybe our 
normative beliefs are unsafe insofar as they are about non-natural facts. If 
they are unsafe and insensitive in the ways described above, call our nor-
mative beliefs  robustly oblivious to the facts. Realization that our beliefs are 
robustly oblivious is an even better defeater than mere obliviousness. 
 Unfortunately, I am not at all confi dent about what the metric of near-
ness is for safety checks. I worry that safety involves a nearness metric that 
is far too deferential to the beliefs we are testing to provide epistemic checks 
with real bite. So I will not pursue robust obliviousness any farther. Th e 
skeptic’s clearest case rests on mere obliviousness. 
 5.  THE MOOREAN REPLY 
 Here is another thing that worries me about obliviousness. While I fi nd 
obliviousness a compelling defeater I am not inclined to abandon my nor-
mative beliefs. Pain is bad, torturing people at random is wrong, P’s likely 
truth is a reason to believe that P, and so on. But it is important to bear in 
mind that the Coincidence Argument does not imply that we are unjusti-
fi ed in believing these things, but rather that we are unjustifi ed in believing 
these things insofar as they are about non-natural normative facts. For the 
argument relies on a premise about non-natural purport. Th is bears directly 
on a Moorean reply to the skeptical conclusion. Let me turn to it. 
 It often helps to notice that one is not forced to accept the conclusion of 
a valid argument populated by premises one already accepts. Th ere is always 
the option of rejecting one of the premises, and this is the rational thing to 
do when one is more justifi ed in believing the negation of the conclusion 
than one is justifi ed in believing the conjunction of the premises. Parfi t 
makes this move in relation to evolutionary debunking arguments. His pre-
ferred formulation is the following:
 (1) [Our normative] beliefs were often advantageous, by causing us to 
have true worldly beliefs which helped us to survive and reproduce. 
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 (2) Because these normative beliefs were advantageous, natural selec-
tion made us disposed to have them. 
 (3) Th ese beliefs would have had the same eff ects whether or not they 
were true. 
 Th erefore 
 (4) Th ese beliefs would have been advantageous whether or not they 
were true. 
 Th erefore 
 (5) Natural selection would have disposed us to have these beliefs 
whether or not they were true. 
 (6) We have no empirical evidence for the truth of these beliefs. 
 (7) We have no other way of knowing whether these beliefs are true. 
 Th erefore 
 We cannot justifi ably believe that these beliefs are true. (2011: 
512, 525–6) 
 In both the epistemic and practical cases, one of his responses is that we are 
more certain or justifi ed in normative claims—e.g. when a belief is likely 
true, we have reason to believe it (p. 521), and torturing children for fun 
is wrong (p. 544)—than we are of the premises of the skeptical argument. 
 Parfi t identifi es (7) as a weak link (in addition to premise (2)). But it is 
important to note that (3), and so also (4) and (5), relies on a suppressed 
premise: that normative beliefs are about non-natural facts. 18 Without this, 
there is little reason to think that normative beliefs would be selected for 
or caused regardless of their truth. If the fact that an action is right just is 
the fact that an action maximizes happiness, and the belief that an action is 
right just refers to this fact, it might not be adaptive to believe that actions 
are right regardless of whether they maximize happiness. At least, I would 
need to hear more to be convinced. 
 Th e import of a non-naturalist suppressed premise is this. One can get a 
lot of mileage out of an apparent threat to beliefs no one is willing to aban-
don, e.g. that torturing people at random is wrong. But if the skeptical argu-
ment relies on the premise that these beliefs are about non-natural entities a 
clear way out of the problem is to abandon the off ending meta-ethical posi-
tion. We can leave Parfi t’s Moorean data intact and reject non-naturalism. 19 
Th is also helps us to see that the argument is not self-defeating. It does 
presume a certain kind of normative signifi cance:  certain considerations 
available to the mind count as epistemic defeaters. But the argument only 
 18  Th ings are complicated by Parfi t’s “non-metaphysicalism.” I  think we can safely 
put this in the non-naturalist camp so long as it is not a veiled form of non-cognitivism. 
 19  See also Bedke (2009: 205). 
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undermines that claim when conjoined with a meta-normative claim about 
Non-Natural Purport. 
 Even better, our reaction to the Coincidence Argument might itself pro-
vide some evidence that our normative beliefs are not about non-natural 
facts. Normally, we expect beliefs about matters of fact to go out of exist-
ence when we receive defeaters. Perhaps failures to obey this expectation can 
be explained away on a case-by-case basis. But it would be much harder to 
explain why all beliefs about a certain domain of fact (the normative) are 
systematically recalcitrant in the face of what we take to be good defeaters 
for those beliefs. Th is, I submit, is the situation the realist faces when she 
realizes that her normative beliefs are systematically recalcitrant in the face 
of the coincidence-as-obliviousness defeater. Th e fact that she is not the 
least inclined to abandon her normative commitments in the face of the 
defeater is some evidence that these normative commitments are not beliefs 
about non-natural properties after all. 20 
 So it is looking as though resistance to the Coincidence Argument is fueled 
primarily by steadfast commitment to one’s normative beliefs, and this can 
lead some to think there must be something wrong with the Coincidence 
Argument. But that position feels compelling only because we have not 
clearly separated out normative commitments and meta-normative options. 
Th e least justifi ed premise is the one regarding normative non-naturalism. 
And it becomes even less justifi ed when one realizes that one’s norma-
tive beliefs are recalcitrant in the face of a defeater for justifi ed belief in 
non-natural fact. 
 6.  CONCLUSION 
 I have tried to sort through some of the key moves in the coincidence litera-
ture. To my mind, the skeptical case is best expressed in terms of oblivious-
ness, and we have seen that the modal status of the target domain off ers no 
absolution. 
 One thing I have not addressed is how the points might generalize to, 
say, mathematical Platonism. I think that extensions of the argument are 
problematic. We can intelligibly wonder what would be the case were pain 
not bad. A  meta-normative theory then steps in to inform the subjunc-
tive. Under non-naturalism we may interpret the subjective one way, where 
we consider counterfactuals or allodoxic possibilities about properties and 
facts entirely distinct from any natural ones (though supervenient upon 
them). Naturalism would have us interpret the subjunctive diff erently, as 
 20  See also Bedke (forthcoming). 
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concerning natural properties and facts, in which case it  might be as prob-
lematic as subjunctives about water not being H 2 O. And such subjunctives 
are just diffi  cult on a non-cognitivist meta-normative view. 
 When we turn to mathematics we do not get similarly intelligible fi rst-order 
questions to be glossed in diff erent ways by diff erent meta-mathematical 
positions. I’m not sure what we are asking when we ask what would be the 
case if 2+2 did not equal 4 (without an alternative conceptual schema that 
makes sense of this, and thereby changes the subject). So I’m not sure that 
we get so far as to ask what a Platonic gloss would be, or a structuralist gloss, 
or a naturalist gloss, or what have you. Sure, it is intelligible to ask what 
would be the case were some Platonic objects diff erent, or if they enjoyed 
diff erent relations with the natural world than we think they do. 21 But given 
the status of the fi rst-order mathematical claim, and the unintelligibility of 
its negation on fi rst order (non-meta-mathematical) grounds, it is very hard 
to see how it could be about Platonic objects. At least, this is a problem the 
mathematic case runs up against that the normative case does not. 22 
 Be that as it may, when we follow the argument in the normative case we 
see a defeater on the horizon. Th e natural reaction is to dig in our heels on 
the normative commitments. Th is reaction makes most sense if the norma-
tive commitments are not beliefs about non-natural facts. So, at the end of 
the day, we get a defeater for our normative beliefs insofar as they are about 
non-natural facts, and some evidence that they are not about non-natural 
facts after all. 
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